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In Stern v. Yasuna,1 2 6 Satozky, one of the co-defendant tortfeasors, paid the entire judgment after the appellate division had
affirmed the liability of all the defendants. Two of the joint
tort-feasors received permission to appeal to the court of appeals.
While this appeal was still pending, co-defendant Satozky made
his motion for contribution, which the court granted.
A prior case (apparently the only one in point) in the New
York City Civil Court' 27 had held that the co-defendant was
required to await the outcome of the final appeal before seeking
contribution. The court reasoned that had the legislature intended
to permit the motion immediately, it would have been specifically
provided for in the statute.
The court in the instant case concluded that the "movant is
clearly entitled to the contribution," and added that the other
defendants might apply to an appellate tribunal for the stay denied
them at the trial level.
The practitioner must be aware that this area is still unsettled.
The two lower courts each interpreted the legislature's failure to
provide the "when" as they felt it should be interpreted. The
sections are susceptible to either interpretation.
It is submitted that the reasoning in Stern seems sound, inasmuch as the defendants do have a remedy under CPLR 5519
to stay the enforcement of the judgment.
ARTICLE

20-

MISTAKES, DEFECTS, IRREGULARITIES
EXTENSIONS OF TIME

AND

Opening of a default under CPLR 2004.
In a recent case 1 8 involving a tort action against the City
of New York, the plaintiff appealed from an order which granted
defendant-city's motion to compel plaintiff to accept a tardy
answer. The supreme court, appellate division, affirmed the order,
but denied the imposition of costs against plaintiff.
Under CPLR 2004 the court in its discretion may extend
the time in which pleadings are required to be served, even
though the application for the extension is made after the expiration
of the statutory period, and is thus, in effect, an application to
open a default. Under this section the applicant must show
"good cause" why he cannot, or could not, comply with the
applicable time requirement. The court stated that in view of
the nature of this tort action, it must have been apparent to the
plaintiff's counsel that the City was not deliberately defaulting,
12844
127

Misc. 2d 185, 253 N.Y.S2d 439 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
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and instead of placing an unnecessary burden on the courts, the
matter should have "been disposed of by the exercise of simple
courtesy between attorneys." 29 The imposition of an unnecessary
burden upon the courts and the defendant's counsel would have
warranted the imposition of costs against plaintiff-appellant had
the City not failed "to make a more appropriate showing of a
sufficient excuse and a meritorious defense.... 130
The court, in effect, held that the City had shown the
"good cause" ' required by CPLR 2004 to open a default, but
had failed to make the "appropriate showing of a sufficient excuse"
that would warrant the granting of costs to the City on this
appeal.
In conclusion, attorneys should not attempt to take undue
advantage of an adversary who inadvertently failed to serve a pleading within the applicable statutory period. Such matters should be
disposed of by the exercise of professional courtesy between attorneys,1 32 rather than by placing an unnecessary burden upon
opposing counsel and the courts.
ARTICLE

30-

REMEDIES AND

PLEADING

Defect in verification of a complaint, in action for injunction
in labor dispute, excused.
A verification of a pleading is a "statement under oath that
the pleading is true to the knowledge of the deponent. ..
,, 3
It uses the threat of perjury to achieve its purpose, the minimization
of spurious claims. Its success is doubtful, though, since "with
rare exceptions, district attorneys will not undertake to prosecute
a perjury alleged to emanate from a civil pleading." 13
Usually, a complaint need not be verified. It is required,
however, under certain circumstances. One such circumstance is
an action for an injunction in a labor dispute.
From CPLR 3022 it would appear that where a party is
entitled to a verified pleading, and one is served without sufficient
verification, the party may treat it as a nullity. However, the
Supreme Court of Albany County, in Capital Newspapers Division
2
at 865, 254 N.Y.S.2d at 421.
130 1d. at 865, 254 N.Y.S.2d at 422.
131 "[T]he Corporation Counsel urged that due to the great volume'of
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pleadings which were being processed in his office, there was inadvertent
failure to seek an extension of time to answer." Id. at 865, 254 N.Y.S.2d

at 421.
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